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SCIENCE FOR JUDGES VII INTRODUCTION 
Margaret A. Berger*
The Journal of Law and Policy is once again privileged to 
publish extended versions of papers relating to science and law that 
were presented at a conference for federal and state judges.1 The 
conference, which took place at Brooklyn Law School on March 3 
and 4, 2006, was the seventh in a series of Science for Judges 
programs funded by the Common Benefit Trust established in the 
Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation. It was held 
under the auspices of Brooklyn Law School’s Center for Health, 
Science and Public Policy in collaboration with the Federal 
Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts, and the 
Committee on Science, Technology and Law of the National 
Academies of Science. 
Four of the articles that follow deal with a central concern of 
the Science for Judges program from its inception—the proof of 
causation in toxic tort litigation. It is certainly not surprising that 
this topic was addressed at several of the earlier conferences.2 The 
* Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
Professor Berger is the Director of the Science for Judges Program. 
1 Papers from previous Science for Judges programs can be found in 12 J.L. 
& POL’Y 1, 1-53 (2003) (papers discussing the practice of epidemiology and the 
science produced by administrative agencies); 12 J.L. & POL’Y 485, 485-639 
(2004) (papers discussing toxicology and epidemiology); 13 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1-
179 (2005) (papers iscussing the integrity of scientific research and forensic 
evidence in criminal proceedings); 13 J.L. & POL’Y 499-647 (2005) (papers 
discussing Agent Orange and human behavior research); and 14 J.L. & POL’Y 1-
209 (2006) (papers discussing risk assessment dealing with expert proof of 
causation in toxic tort cases and issues relevant to the availability of data). All 
papers are available in electronic form at http://brooklaw.edu/ 
centers/scienceforjudges/papers.php. 
2 See David Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts—A Primer In 
Toxicology For Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L & POL’Y 5 (2003); Douglas Weed, 
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problem of proving causation—which is usually at the heart of 
toxic tort cases—is undoubtedly a direct cause of the Science for 
Judges programs. Training judges to understand complex scientific 
concepts took on a new urgency after the United States Supreme 
Court’s 1993 opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,3 required trial judges to make a preliminary finding that 
proffered scientific expert testimony was reliable and relevant 
before it could be admitted. Daubert was a toxic tort case in which 
the contested crucial issue was causation, as was General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner,4 the second case in which the Court explored criteria 
for the admissibility of expert proof. So from the first, the trial 
judge’s role as “gatekeeper” in admitting expert testimony was 
intertwined with rulings on expert testimony offered to prove that 
defendant’s product caused plaintiff’s alleged adverse health 
effect. 
The emphasis on causation at these programs is not, however, 
due solely to the historical connection between Daubert and 
Causation: An Epidemiologic Perspective (In Five Parts), 12 J.L. & POL’Y  43 
(2003); John Concato, Overview Of Research Design In Epidemiology, 12 J.L & 
POL’Y 489 (2004); John Ionnides & Joseph Lau, Systematic Review of Medical 
Evidence, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 509 (2004); James Robins, Should Compensation 
Schemes Be Based On The Probability Of Causation Or Expected Years Of Life 
Lost?, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 537 (2004); Jeanne Stellman & Steven Stellman, 
Characterization of Exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam Veterans as a Basis 
for Epidemiological Studies, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 505 (2005); David Butler, 
Connections: The Early History of Scientific and Medical Research on “Agent 
Orange,” 13 J.L. & POL’Y 527 (2005); Irva Hertz-Picciotto, How Scientists View 
Causality and Assess Evidence: A Study of the Institute of Medicine’s 
Evaluation of Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans and Agent Orange, 13 J.L. & 
POL’Y 553 (2005); Joseph Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation In Humans 
Exposed To Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. POL’Y 39 (2005); Gary Marchant, Genetic 
Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2005); Lisa Heinzerling, 
Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65 (2005). 
3 509 U.S. 579 (1998). 
4 522 U.S. 136 (1997). The third case in which the Supreme Court 
considered the admissibility of expert proof, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137 (1999), turned on causation in a products liability action that did 
not involve a toxic tort. See Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy 
on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE (Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed. 2000). 
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educational scientific programs for judges. Proving causation in 
toxic tort cases would have been a core part of any judicial 
curriculum on science even if the Supreme Court’s new rule for 
admitting expert testimony had been handed down in a case having 
nothing to do with toxic torts. And that, of course, is because 
determining causation is such a difficult, complex issue. Any 
decision is beset by uncertainty because our comprehension of 
disease processes is far from complete. Determining whether a 
particular expert may testify about causation remains a highly 
demanding task for judges. As the reader of these essays will see, 
deciding issues about causation is equally challenging for 
scientists. 
It is, therefore, gratifying to introduce articles by four eminent 
experts whose research is at the cutting edge of understanding and 
explaining causal claims. The principal message that emerges from 
their papers is that determining disease causality requires 
judgment; science at this point in time cannot often offer a 
definitive, clear-cut answer. In addition, all the authors, some more 
explicitly than others, are critical of some of the underlying 
assumptions that can be found in some judicial opinions as 
inconsistent with scientific reasoning. 
The first paper, by Carl Cranor, a professor of philosophy, 
focuses first on what is known about chemicals and then on the 
structure of scientific arguments.5 Professor Cranor explains that 
drawing non-deductive inferences means that gaps in arguments 
will always be encountered, but that methods exist for drawing the 
best-supported conclusion. He stresses that scientists typically 
consider all relevant data in order to assess the strength of the 
available evidence, and gives examples of how pieces of data may 
fit together to produce a conclusion. The Supreme Court’s Joiner6 
opinion has been read by some courts as requiring judges to pass 
individually on the reliability of each study on which an expert 
seeks to rely rather than considering them as a whole. Professor 
Cranor’s paper raises interesting issues about whether a separatist 
5 Carl F. Cranor, A Framework for Assessing Scientific Arguments: Gaps, 
Relevance and Integrated Evidence, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 7 (2006). 
6 Supra, note 4. 
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approach comports with scientific practice. 
Drs. Melnick and Bucher are toxicologists at the National 
Toxicology Program at the National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences.7 Their paper provides a valuable overview of 
how toxicological studies have been used in making public health 
decisions, how they are designed, and how they are combined with 
other data, such as epidemiological studies. For judges handling 
toxic tort cases, perhaps the most useful discussion appears in 
Section III on Evaluation Issues. It suggests that courts may be out 
of touch with current research when they ignore animal studies as 
irrelevant because they do not relate to humans and expose animals 
to higher doses than those administered to persons. Toxicological 
studies have been gathering mechanistic data comparing the 
metabolizing of particular chemicals in humans and animals. These 
studies show that extrapolation to humans may be appropriate in 
certain cases, explain why adverse reactions to a particular 
substance may sometimes be observable in species, like mice, but 
not in others like rats, and reveal that the sites of tumors in animals 
may not always correspond to those in humans. Section IV of the 
Melnick-Bucher article explains how dose-response data from 
animal studies are converted to human equivalent doses. This is a 
paper which presents toxicology as an evolving experimental 
science that will undoubtedly play an increasingly important role 
in determining disease causality. 
The next two papers focus on epidemiology. Dr. Steven N. 
Goodman’s thesis is that the determination of causal claims in 
toxic tort cases is often “left to a formulaic misapplication of what 
are regarded as scientific criteria for proof.”8 He first takes on 
traditional, frequentist statistics which he criticizes for producing 
results that on average may be correct but terribly wrong in a 
particular case. Next he explores Bayesian statistics and the 
difficulty of calculating the prior probability needed for a Bayesian 
analysis, and then turns to instances in which insisting on a relative 
risk greater than 2 to prove specific causation leads to invalid 
7 Ronald L. Melnick & John R. Bucher, Determining Disease Causality 
from Experimental Toxicology Studies, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 111 (2006). 
8 Steven N. Goodman, Judgment for Judges: What Traditional Statistics 
Don’t Tell You About Causal Claims, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 92, 92 (2006). 
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results. He concludes that “the truth of causal claims is not 
calculable from the data alone,”9 and instead proposes principles 
that judges should use in determining general and specific 
causation in toxic tort cases. His recommendations require 
judgment, a close look at prior studies and the strength of their 
design and implementation, and careful attention to biologic 
principles. 
Dr. Douglas Weed’s article explores the nature of scientific 
judgment in depth.10 He explains why it is needed and examines 
the various essential functions expert judgment performs, although 
he concedes that the exact nature of judgment is complex and 
elusive. Dr. Weed provides a brief philosophical tour of a variety 
of values and criteria that have been proposed as attributes of 
scientific inquiry, and concludes by setting out a taxonomy of 
different types of judgment. He stresses the importance of not only 
assessing the outcome of a judgment but also of appraising the 
process by which judgments about causal claims are reached. 
Exercising judgment, is of course, what judges do. Although it 
may be disturbing that there is no magic formula for determining 
the validity of a causal claim, it may also be reassuring to be 
reminded that legal and scientific reasoning share some of the 
same attributes: careful attention to relevant facts and how they are 
derived, understanding what is sought to be proved, assessing 
probative value, and being mindful of biases. 
The fifth article that appears in this volume of the Journal of 
Law and Policy deals with a very different, but equally significant 
topic at the intersection of science and the law: the operation of 
forensic laboratories.11 Here, too, Daubert has played a significant 
9 Id. at 104. 
10 Douglas L. Weed, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Judgment, 15 J. 
L.& POL’Y 132 (2006). 
11 Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating Crime Laboratories: The Impact of DNA 
Evidence, 15 J. L.& POL’Y 58 (2006). Presentations by Peter Neufeld, Esq., a 
co-director of the Innocence Project, William A. Gardner, Executive Director of 
the American Registry of Pathology, and Timothy P. McMahon, Ph.D., 
Supervisor of Validation and Quality Control Armed Forces DNA Identification 
Laboratory, three of the other speakers at the session on Forensic Laboratories: 
Current Issues and Standards at the Science for Judges VII conference may be 
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role. The article by Professor Paul Giannelli of Case Western 
Reserve University Law School, who has long sought to alert the 
legal community about the deplorable state of many forensic 
laboratories,12 concludes that significant reforms are finally in the 
offing. After a brief survey of the early history of American crime 
laboratories, he turns to developments in the 70’s and 80’s. He 
then discusses in greater detail DNA evidence’s revolutionary 
impact on forensic science, and comments on the effect the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert is beginning to have on 
rethinking the admissibility of traditional forensic evidence that 
had never previously been challenged. In addition, Professor 
Giannelli examines pending initiatives of the American Bar 
Association that bear on reforms pertaining to crime labs. It 
appears that we are on the verge of important changes in the 
handling of scientific evidence in criminal cases. 
I hope these highly abbreviated summaries whet your interest 
in reading the sophisticated, cutting-edge articles that follow. 
Understanding scientific principles and process is of the utmost 
importance to judges and lawyers: life and death outcomes and 
vast amounts of money not infrequently turn on issues relating to 
scientific proof. 
 
 
viewed at http://www.brooklaw.edu/centers/ scienceforjudges/events.php (click 
on video under the Science for Judges VII listing). 
12 See, e.g., The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: 
The Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST.L.J. 671 (1988). 
